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Many countries have sought to increase the efficiency of national railroad companies 
through a range of reforms: separating infrastructure and operations, creating independent 
regulatory institutions and providing access to the network to third parties. While the 
European Commission has declared these reforms crucial elements for developing the 
European railroad industry, little is known about the effects of reforms on railroad 
efficiency. We investigate a new World Bank panel data set that covers many EU 
countries over a period of 20 years. We compare the passenger traffic efficiency of 
national railroad companies by means of a production frontier model and evaluate the 
effects of reforms on efficiency. We also introduce a new way to control for the effect of 
freight traffic on efficiency of passenger traffic. We find that reforms have efficiency-
increasing effects but that the effect of reforms depends on sequencing: The introduction 
of multiple reforms in a package has at best neutral effects, but sequential reforms 
improve efficiency. Using the LISREL technique, we find that our results are robust 
against potential problems of endogeneity. 
 
Keywords: production frontier, network industries, panel data analysis, passenger and 
freight traffic. 
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1. Introduction 
By the end of the 20th century, railroads were in dire straits. Although most national 
railways companies were, and still are, heavily subsidized (Crozet et al., 2000, 
Friederiszick et al. 2003), the market shares of railways in total (intermodal) 
transportation were, at best, stable. In many European countries, rail market shares 
decreased throughout the nineties (European Commission, DG Energy and Transport, 
2002). Moreover, surveys show that customer satisfaction with railway services was low 
in many countries (INRA, 2000). 
The European Commission, in its White Paper (EC, 2001), has declared the 
development of the European railway system one of its priorities in achieving sustainable 
development in Europe. It is an explicit goal of the Commission to promote railways, 
increase their market share, and reduce subsidies. Based on the experience in a number of 
countries that have introduced reforms throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the cornerstones 
of the EC reform model (EC, Directive 91/440) are: a) to unbundle infrastructure from 
operations, that is, to them separate them fully or, at least, create separate organizations 
and accounts within one holding, b) to create independent regulatory institutions for 
railways, c) to open access to national railway markets for competitors (“third party 
access”). 
There is a firm believe among many policy-makers, on both EU and national 
level, that these reforms ought to increase efficiency. But, while there is a substantial 
literature on efficiency in the railway industry (Cantos et al. 1999, Cantos et al. 2000, 
Coelli and Perelman, 1999, Cowie and Riddington, 1996, Gathon and Perelman, 1992, 
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Oum and Yu, 1994), little is known about how regulatory reforms have affected railway 
efficiency.  
We are only aware of two papers. Cantos et al. (1999) analyze the impact of four 
types of reforms on different dimensions of railway efficiency. They look at separation 
between infrastructure and operations, changes in the legal constitution of companies, 
degree of regulation of prices, and degree of government influence over investment. They 
find that vertical separation appears to have had the strongest impact. However, 
construction of their regulatory variables does not allow using variations over time, but 
only across countries. Gathon and Pestieau (1995) cross-sectional study indicates that 
constraints on managerial autonomy may reduce the efficiency of railway firms. 
In this study, we investigate systematically to what extent third-party access, 
independent regulation, and separation of infrastructure affect railway performance. As 
different countries have implemented the reforms to different degrees and at different 
times, we are in position to identify the impact of regulatory regimes on railway 
performance. To do so, we use the production frontier approach, pioneered by Farrell 
(1957). 
We apply this methodology to a new Worldbank (2001) panel dataset that 
provides input and output data for 11 European countries, over the period 1980-2000. We 
match this dataset with information about regulatory reforms in these countries and look 
at the impact of reforms on the efficiency in passenger traffic.  
The paper has four contributions: First, we control for the congestion effects of 
freight traffic on the efficiency of passenger traffic. Second, we control for the potential 
endogeneity of explanatory variables and reforms by investigating the structure of the 
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variance-covariance matrix, using the LISREL technique, introduced by Jöreskog (1973) 
and used in a similar context before by Ivaldi et al (1995). Third, we look at the effects of 
reforms and fourth, present efficiency measures for the twelve countries in our panel. 
The main results are as follows: First, on average, if freight traffic increases by 
one percent, passenger traffic decreases by two and half tenth of a percent, a value larger 
than what is usually assumed in comparable studies. Second, there does not seem to be 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Third, reforms increase efficiency, that is, 
railroad performance would have, ceteris paribus, been lower in the absence of reforms. 
In particular, we find that while it is always efficiency enhancing to implement one 
reform, the effect of a larger number of reforms depends on sequencing. The introduction 
of multiple reforms in a package has at best neutral effects, but sequential reforms 
improve efficiency. It is also noteworthy that our regressions cannot identify that full 
separation of infrastructure from operations is a conditio sine qua non for railroad 
efficiency. Fourth, the development of efficiency overtime has been quite different across 
different countries. In general, smaller country railroads have had a more favorable 
efficiency development than larger countries (measured in terms of network length). 
Among larger countries, only Sweden and Germany have been able to increase their 
railroad efficiency, both concerning passenger and total (that is, passenger and freight) 
traffic, throughout the period of observation (1980-2000).  
Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 introduces the econometric model and looks 
at endogeneity issues. Section 4 presents the results, constructs and compares efficiency 
measures. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
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2. The Data 
The Worldbank (2001) data set comprises coherent and complete input and output 
information on railway industries of 11 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden. Data cover 1980 
to 2000, the period in which all reforms in the railroad sector have occurred in Europe.  
Unfortunately, data for United Kingdom are not complete. In particular, as a result 
of the reforms, there is no consistent information about staff of railroad firms for the 
period from 1995 to 2000. National statistics in UK after the reform of the railways 
changed: People who formerly were counted as railway staff since then belonged to other 
industries like the construction industry or consulting. Therefore the official number of 
employees in the railway industry is much lower than it would be on a comparable basis. 
This makes it hard to evaluate railroads efficiency in the most interesting period and we 
will thus have to exclude UK from many of our regressions.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the data. In terms of output we will look at 
passenger kilometers and freight ton kilometers. Table 1 reports means per country over 
the investigation period, showing that, in most countries, both outputs have increased in 
absolute values. 
In the case of railroads, it is difficult to identify the correct input measures. 
Railroads are often integrated firms. The intermediate input “network” is produced by the 
inputs labor and land. This intermediate input network, additional labor, and rolling stock 
are then used in the production of the final outputs, passenger-kilometers and freight-ton-
kilometers. The last column represents the measure for labor, staff, employed by railway 
carriers. In the regression this variable will be labelled Lit.  
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To find the right measure of capital input is not so easy a task. There are two 
problems: First, rolling stock can be interpreted both as input or output. At given labor 
and finance input, for instance, a company can decide to produce more passenger 
kilometers with old rolling stocks or higher quality traffic with new rolling stock. 
Similarly, a company can decide to build new faster or better tracks. In order to avoid this 
potential confusion between inputs and outputs, we focus on route kilometers as the 
second input besides staff. Route kilometers measure the total size of the network without 
taking into account whether a given connection has single, double or multiple tracks. 
They thus have the convenient feature to be clearly inputs, not outputs: In the mature 
networks of European countries, only few new routes are built. Actually, throughout the 
period we are interested in, route kilometers have decreased rather than increased in most 
countries. In the regressions, route kilometers are labelled Kit.  
We have matched these physical data with information about reforms. Table 2 
presents these deregulation data. It reports the year in which regulatory reforms were 
introduced and stems from a variety of documents: Erasmus University (1999), SORT-IT 
(1999), OECD (1998), Stoffaes et al (1995), Prognos (1998). The data have the advantage 
to capture the effects of regulatory changes both over time and across countries. They 
have the disadvantage that they report the state of national laws, and not the 
implementation of these laws. Moreover, there are many reform specificities across 
countries. There are thus certain limits concerning the extent to which one can interpret 
the results. We discuss these issues further in the next section. 
 
 7
3. Econometric specification and endogeneity 
The frontier production function specifies what output can be achieved, if all decisions 
were taken according to “best practice”. As the frontier production function defines a 
theoretically achievable optimum, all empirical observations must lie below it. Consider 
the Cobb-Douglas function:  
.LK LAKy αα=  
In our regressions, output y is either passenger kilometers, or the weighted sum of 
passenger and freight kilometers. Inputs are route kilometers (K) and staff (L). The 
production function is linear in the logs of the inputs. Thus, the log of the output variable 
can be expressed as the following function: 
.lnlnln LKAy LK αα ++=  
As we use a panel data set, we account for individual (country-) fixed effects and 
time trends through the introduction of effects of railway deregulation. Thus, for country i 
at time t, we assume that: 
ititiit tonDeregulatiA εθγα +++= )( 0  
The term )( 0 iti onDeregulatiθγ +  represents technological progress. It may differ across 
countries (and is thus indexed by i). Moreover the country specific trend may depend on 
whether or not a country has reformed its railroad industry. We here introduce a dummy 
variable itonDeregulati  that takes value 1 if a country has introduced (and maintained) at 
least one of three reforms we look at. At this stage we do not distinguish types or 
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intensity of reform, which we will do in other specifications, below.4 The other 
components of the expression are an intercept and a normally distributed noise term.  
The equation we estimate is then: 
 .)(lnlnln 0 itiitLitKit tonDeregulatiLKy εθγααα +++++=   (1) 
 
3.1 Output measures: total traffic versus passenger traffic 
We are mainly interested the efficiency of passenger transport. Nonetheless, as we have 
no information about how capital and labor are allocated for the production of passenger 
and freight traffic, we must control econometrically for the effect of freight transportation 
on passenger traffic efficiency. In order to do so, we estimate Equation (1), using an 
aggregate output measure defined as 
 ititit tonkmpasskmy lnlnln λ+=   (2)  
In what follows, we use λˆ , the estimate of λ  that provides the best fit of the model, 
or to be more precise, the λˆ  that minimizes the fit function for Equation (1). For different 
specifications, λˆ  lies between 0.24 and 0.27. That is, on average, if freight traffic 
increases by one percent, passenger traffic decreases by two and half tenth of a percent. 
The advantage of our method is that we receive an empirical measure for the congestive 
effects of freight on passenger traffic, rather than using ad hoc measures. Other studies 
have assumed, for instance, that each passenger equals a certain fixed weight of freight, 
                                                 
4 One could, alternatively, use a different type of specification in which deregulation would not enter 
multiplicatively with time, but, rather, a term itonDeregulati0θ  would be added to the constant. This, however, 
would not take into consideration that the effects of reforms shift the slope of the trend and not only the 
level. 
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specifically 80 kilograms. According to our estimate, the congestion effect owing to 
freight is higher.5 
 
3.2 Endogeneity and LISREL estimates 
In our data set and with the specification we use, there is a potential problem of 
endogeneity: while we control for individual (country-level) effects, we can a priori, not 
exclude correlations of these individual effects with inputs (capital, labor). If there were 
such correlations, the regression results and the measure for efficiency, which is based on 
the error terms of the regression, would be biased. 
We use the LISREL (“Linear Structural Relations”)6 method to verify whether or 
not this type of correlation is present in the data. LISREL has the convenient feature of 
estimating all possible correlations between inputs and individual effects and hence, for 
our case, between input quantities and individual technical efficiency levels. In Appendix 
2, we briefly discuss the method.  
Table 6 summarizes the results of the LISREL analysis. By looking at the 
covariances of different variables and at their associated t-values, it becomes clear that 
there is no correlation between variables. The results of our regressions are thus unbiased.  
 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that while our method has advantages over using ad hoc aggregation weights, 
there are some methodological issues associated with aggregating multi-product outputs to a single output 
(see Alvarez and Orea (2001) for a discussion of the caveats of aggregation to a single output). Note that it 
is however not our objective to estimate the full production possibility set (PPS), and that equation (2) is 
not an approximation of this PPS. Rather it is a point on the “true” unobserved PPS at which we investigate 
inefficiency. By using eq. (2), we are only able to compute inefficiency level of the passenger service 
conditional on the actual level of freight service. Identifying the full PPS is a research topic beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
6 See Jöreskog (1973, 1996). 
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4. Regression results and efficiency comparison 
In what follows we present and discuss OLS estimates. These are also used to construct 
efficiency measures.  
 
4.1 Results 
Table 3 presents the regression results. We have run the regression both including and 
excluding United Kingdom. The dependent variable is aggregated output as defined in 
Equation (2). The parameter estimates for labor and capital are in line with what could be 
expected for a network industry like railroads. As 1>+ LK αα , there are increasing 
returns to scale. Note also that in all countries except Finland, the productivity trend is 
positive. The regression shows that, excluding United Kingdom, deregulation increases 
the productivity trend of a country at the 7% level of statistical significance.7 In terms of 
magnitude of output changes, this corresponds to an additional output of on average 0.4 
percent per year after deregulation.8 
These effects are less significant when one includes United Kingdom. This points 
to the problem with United Kingdom data. With the beginning of reforms, data quality 
for United Kingdom has declined, and data for staff since 1995 are missing. In what 
follows we thus run most regressions without United Kingdom. 
                                                 
7 As an example, total productivity for Austria changes from 0.01 to 0.014, for Germany from 0.02 to 
0.024, and for France from 0.05 to 0.054, after introduction of deregulation.  
8 To compute the magnitude, we first write output as εγθαα eteontDeregulatieLLKAKy = . To measure of the 
effect of deregulation dummy on output, we compute ),1/()1,1/( tonDeregulatiyEtonDeregulatiyE =−+= . Notice 
that as 0θˆ  is normally distributed with mean θ0, 0
θˆ









θ +=eE . 
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The first regression shows that reforms have affected railroad productivity in a 
positive way. In order to see whether more reforms are better than one reform, we have 
constructed a second set of reform variables: DeregulationOneAspectit, which takes the 
value 1 when one and only one aspect of the deregulation is implemented, whatever 
happens later, and 0 otherwise. DeregulationTwoAspectsit, which takes the value 1 when 
exactly two aspects of the deregulation are implemented and 0 otherwise. Both inter 
multiplicatively with time, as for Deregulation before. 
The results presented in Table 4 show that the implementation of only one aspect 
of the deregulation has a positive effect on the productivity trend of a country, whereas 
the effect of the implementation of two aspects is neutral. 
The fact that two reforms do not improve productivity compared to no reform is 
discomforting. However, it is important to notice that the group of countries with two 
reforms is very heterogeneous. In some countries (Austria, Finland, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden), the two reforms (not necessarily the same across countries) were implemented 
sequentially. In other countries (France, Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal), both were 
implemented at the same time, as a “package”. To get some idea of whether sequencing 
matters, we define a new set of variables that allows to distinguish the types of reform: 
DeregulationPartialit takes the value 1 if a reform is implemented, and no further reforms 
take place, and 0 otherwise. DeregulationSequentialit takes the value 1 if a reform is 
implemented, and it is followed by further reforms, and 0 otherwise. 
DeregulationPackageit, takes the value 1 if more than one reform are implemented by the 
same time, 0 otherwise. 
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The results indicate that there is a difference in implementing a given number of 
reforms in one blow or gradually. Doing too much by the same time appears to be 
dominated by a more careful gradual strategy.  
Two comments arise. First, package reforms have a neutral effect when one 
excludes United Kingdom, but the effect becomes negative under inclusion of United 
Kingdom. This does not only stress again that the lacking United Kingdom data are 
complicating our analysis, it also points to a more important limitation of interpreting the 
parameter estimates of the reform variables. The results must be taken with a grain of 
salt, as the variable DeregulationPackage entails countries that have quite different 
models of reforms and different railroad specificities. For instance, while both France and 
Germany introduced the same reforms into their law books (some unbundling of 
infrastructure and operations, third party access), the implementation of these reforms 
have differed largely. In Germany the possibility of third-party access has led to entry of 
many new competitors, while no new competitors have entered the French market. To a 
similar extent, the implementation of infrastructure separation has been quite different in 
Germany from the one in France. While Germany chose an organizational solution in 
which infrastructure and operations remain in the same holding, France decided to create 
a separate infrastructure company that is not under the purview of SNCF. However, track 
allocation and management have been contracted back to SNCF. This example illustrates 
how difficult it is to operationalize empirically different types of reform implementation. 
Second, to investigate the effect of different types of implementation of 
infrastructure separation, we have regressed output on these two different types of 
implementation. We use institutional work (Prognos, 1998) that classifies countries 
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according to organizational or institutional types of infrastructure separation (see Table 
9). Countries that have opted for organizational separation have created separate bodies 
and separate accounting, but retain them under the umbrella of one holding infrastructure. 
Other countries have created two (or more) independent institutions.  
Controlling for these two different types of reform and looking at efficiency 
(results are available on request), we find that there is no significant difference between 
no separation at all and organizational separation. Full (or institutional separation) has a 
positive effect on efficiency, but only when one excludes UK. Our model can thus not 
identify that institutional separation of infrastructure from operations is a conditio sine 
qua non for railroad efficiency. 
With the current data, one can unfortunately not go much further in investigating 
the role of different types of implementation of reforms. The regression results do, 
however, indicate that there is a need to measure implementation in order to evaluate 
policy reforms in a comprehensive way. 
 
4.2 Efficiency 
Using the regression results, we now investigate the development of railway efficiency in 
Europe. We construct the efficiency (performance) measure for total (passenger and 
freight) traffic as follows.9 Using iLK γθλααα ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ 0 , the parameter estimates, the 
logarithm of the observed values for capital, labor, and the values for deregulation and 
time for each country, we compute the estimate of the logarithm of output for country i at 
time t. Deducting this estimate from the realized value for the respective country yields 
                                                 
9 The method is explained in more details in Gathon (1991). 
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the residual of the regression, itε . We then rank the residuals and denote as maxtε the 
highest residual in year t.10 We then express the performance of all other countries 
compared to the country with the highest performance by the following measure: 
)exp( maxtititEff εε −≡  (3) 
The residual here measures the part of the output of a country i at time t that 
cannot be captured by the estimates of the productivity parameters of the Cobb-Douglas 
function. Notice that these productivity parameters do not vary over time. Variations of 
output that cannot be explained by variations of inputs or productivity trends can in 
principle be owing to regulatory regimes. We control for these influences. Variations may 
also be owing to different types of implementation of reforms, and, in particular, to 
different degrees of managerial efficiency, both of which we do not control for. Notice 
that the efficiency measure takes the value 1 (or 100%) for the country with the highest 
performance in the year t. 
Tables 7a and 7b present the results for smaller and larger countries separately, 
taking into account total railways transportation, that is, both freight and passengers. 
Tables 8a and 8b show the efficiency for passenger traffic only, computed as follows:  
)ln(lnˆ)exp( maxmax tonkmtonkmPassEff ittitit −+−≡ λεε  (4) 
The first term on the right hand side represents total traffic efficiency, and the second 
term represents the impact of freight transportation. As the value in the parenthesis is 
negative, we thus correct total efficiency by the relative level of freight efficiency of a 
                                                 
10 The residual here measures the part of the output of a country i at time t that cannot be captured by the 
estimates of the productivity parameters of the Cobb-Douglas function. Notice that these productivity 
parameters do not vary over time. Variations of output that cannot be explained by variations of inputs or 
productivity trends must thus be either due to regulatory regimes, which we control for, or different degrees 
of efficiency. 
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country. Thus, only if a country is both most efficient in terms of freight and passenger 
traffic, it shows a 100% efficiency degree in Tables 7a and 7b. 
We have plotted country efficiency levels in different ways. Figures 1 and 2 look 
at the efficiency development of countries over time, for total and passenger traffic, 
respectively. The depicted efficiency levels are computed relative to the period in which 
the country reached its highest efficiency level.  
It appears that the development is quite similar for both types of traffic (efficiency 
levels across the two types of traffics turn out to be highly correlated). While smaller 
countries, except for the Netherlands, have been able keep or raise their efficiency levels, 
among larger countries only Sweden and Germany have been able to increase their 
efficiency, and Spain has been roughly stable.  
In Figures 3 and 4 we normalize the sum of all country efficiency levels to 100%. 
The graph allows comparing the efficiency level of different countries. The component 
on top of each bar represents the sum of efficiency levels of all small countries. The 
following components of the bar represent the shares of Sweden, Spain, Italy, Germany 
and France in the sum of all country efficiency levels. For example, we notice that in 
1999, Germany is relatively more efficient than the other countries. Moreover, we see 
that the relative efficiency of Germany increased from 1993 to 1999, and decreases in 
2000. This does not necessarily mean that Germany starts to become “less efficient” in 
2000: Germany may continue to be more and more efficient, but other countries 
efficiency gains may be stronger than the ones of Germany. 
Figures 5 and 6 show the relative efficiency levels of large countries only, while 
figures 7 and 8 present the same information, but by averages of five-year periods. 
 16
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has investigated a new panel data set, which we have enriched by information 
about changes in regulatory regimes over the last twenty years. We find that reforms have 
had positive impact on output. The efficiency development of European carriers has been 
quite heterogenous. The LISREL analysis of the variance/covariance structure shows that 
the results are not subject to endogeneity issues. An additional contribution lies in the fact 
that we have controlled for the effect of freight traffic on passenger traffic efficiency 
without relying on ad-hoc weights given to freight versus passenger traffic. 
An additional important result is that sequencing matters: Introducing a number of 
reforms by the same time, as a package, does not improve efficiency. Sequential reforms, 
however, do improve efficiency. The railroad sector seems to be quite sensitive to 
changes in the regulatory framework and, in particular, to the way reforms are 
implemented. Better data are needed to come to a conclusion about the most appropriate 
policy solution for the deregulation of railways. 
Some limitations of our study should be noted. First, owing to data problems, we 
have not been able to include UK data in most of the regressions. Second, we have to date 
only been able to look at reforms in the law book, and cannot control for different types 
and intensity of implementation. Third, we have not taken into account that the degree of 
subsidization is quite different across European countries as Friederiszick et al (2003) 
have shown. This may have an important impact on our measure of efficiency. Finally, 
we have only used quantitative measures of output, and not quality, an important issue 
about which, however, there exist no good data. 
 17
The result about positive effects of deregulation corroborates what has been found 
in studies on other network industries. Ng and Seabright (2001) find that in the period 
from 1990 to 1995, European airline costs could have dropped by as much as 26%, 
provided European airlines were privately owned and subject to the same degree of 
competition as US carriers. Also related is the study of Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2002), 
who show that product market regulation discouraging entry or distorting competition 
reduce the efficiency of many industries in the OECD. 
The reforms we have looked at are quite similar: Third-party access makes it 
possible to enter foreclosed markets, and the unbundling of infrastructure and operations 
makes potential anti-competitive pricing of infrastructure or non-pricing discrimination 
harder. But, our regressions seem to indicate that much depends on the way reforms are 
implemented. Other empirical (Ivaldi and McCullough, 2002) and theoretical work, for 
instance, Vickers (1995) and King (1999) make similar points: Building the reform of 
network industries on a one-size-fits-all model of separation of infrastructure from 
operations may not be a fruitful way to enhance efficiency. 
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